Sales: Failure to File Upon Removal Voids Vendor\u27s Reservation of Title Against a Bona Fide Purchaser by Huff, Margaret M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 4 Spring 1963 Article 16
Sales: Failure to File Upon Removal Voids Vendor's
Reservation of Title Against a Bona Fide Purchaser
Margaret M. Huff
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Margaret M. Huff, Sales: Failure to File Upon Removal Voids Vendor's Reservation of Title Against a Bona Fide Purchaser, 46 Marq. L. Rev.
555 (1963).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol46/iss4/16
RECENT DECISIONS
discovery proceedings. This type of order is not appealable in the
fedeal courts.2 Moreover, when such order is issued the corporation's
attorney must turn over the requested information. The detrimental
effects upon a business whose trade secrets, vital to its continued
success, must be disclosed to its competitors are obvious. Irreparable
damage could be caused to the corporation before an opportunity
would arise to have the question reviewed by an appellate tribunal.
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. demonstrates that the
Radiant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Association case has not started
a general trend in the law. The attorney-client privilege is deeply in-
grained and its application to a corporate client will be difficult to
dislodge.
23
STEPHEN L. BEYER
Sales: Failure to File upon Removal Voids Vendor's Reserva-
tion of Title as against a Bona Fide Purchaser-One James pur-
chased a car from Hudiburg, an Oklahoma dealer, paying the $500.00
down payment with a worthless check and executing a conditional sale
contract for the remainder of the purchase price. Hudiburg held the
certificate of title. James then took the car to Georgia where he ob-
tained a certificate of title (Georgia being a "no title" state). He
brought the car to Wisconsin, obtained a Wisconsin certificate of title,
and sold the car to a dealer who sold it to Ponce. This suit was
instituted by Hudiburg, who located the car two years later, to replevy
it from Ponce. The Court held that Hudiburg could not assert title
against Ponce, because the conditional sale contract had not been filed
in Wisconsin within ten days after Hudiburg received notice of its re-
moval to this state. Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce.1
A conditional sale contract is an example of the divided property
interest or "split title" concept.2 In a conditional sale the vendor usually
delivers the goods to the vendee, but retains title in himself until the
price is fully paid.3 The vendee has possession and beneficial ownership
of the goods while the vendor's reserved title is his security for the
payment of the price and is equal to the outstanding balance due him
on the price.'
22 The only interlocutory orders which are appealable are those set forth in 28
U.S.C. 1292.
23 A subsequent article will deal with another approach to the problem in
which a federal district court applies state law to decide a similar fact situ-
ation and applies the privilege to a corporate client. United States v. Becton
Dickinson and Co., 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).117 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W. 2d 252 (1962).
2 VOLD, LAW OF SALES §57 (2d ed. 1959).
3 See BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES §29 (1924). (ULA, Vol.
2A).
4 Supra note 2.
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At common law, because of the theory that one cannot ordinarily
transfer more interest in a thing than he has in it,' this conditional
sale contract was enforceable not only against the vendee, but against
a third party who "acquired an interest" in the property from the
vendee.' In other words, the third party succeeded only to the limited
interest of the conditional vendee, that being the only interest the
vendee had to transfer.7 The same result obtained when the third
party was a bona fide purchaser," and any purchaser from this "b.f.p."
acquired no more right than he had,9 which was the limited interest
originally transferred. This meant that the vendor could follow his
chattel into the hands of the "b.f.p." and even the purchaser from him.
This is an illustration of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.
Courts became dissatisfied with this principle, which alowed a
seller's secret lien to be enforceable against a "b.f.p.," and a method was
devised whereby a purchaser could acquire notice of any lien on his
intended vendor's apparent title-recordation of the vendor's lien in
a public place.'0 The notice given by such recording is constructive
so that a person buying from the conditional vendee is bound by the
conditional vendor's security interest if it is recorded, whether he
actually checks the record or not." This device is designed to protect
both the conditional vendor and the prospective purchaser, and changes
the common law rule of caveat emptor so that a purchaser has the
power to cut off his vendor's security interest under an unrecorded
conditional sale contract by selling to a "b.f.p." While many states passed
their own recording acts,'12 twelve passed the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act,'13 which requires a conditional vendor to file his contract in
the county in which the goods are first kept for use by the buyer.' 4 A
conflict of opinion then arose as to whether, if after a conditional sale
contract was properly recorded in the state in which the goods were
originally delivered and those goods were then removed to another
state, the protection of the vendor's reserved title depended on refiling
in the new state, or whether the original recording was determinative
of the rights as between him and any subsequent vendee from his
purchaser. This problem was covered in UCSA jurisdictions by section
14, which states that a vendor must refile upon removal in the county
5 Sherer-Gillet Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925) ; Handley Motor
Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 75 S.E. 2d 312 (1953).
6 Harkness v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663, 672, 674 (1886).
7Supra note 2.
877 C.J.S. Sales §292 (1955).9 Id. §296 (d).
10 Bogert, supra note 3, §52.
"1BLAcK, LAW DIcTIOcrNARY (4th ed. 1951).
12 OKLA. STAT. ANNOT. Title 60, 318 (perm. ed. 1941).
'1 WIs. STAT. §122.06 (1961). This chapter was adopted in 1919.
'14 Ibid.
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to which the goods were removed. The Commissioner's note to section
14 expresses the purpose of such requirement:
If a Uniform law with regard to conditional sales were adopted
and this law provided for the refiling of the contract upon
removal of the goods, the difficulties illustrated ... would be
avoided. A slight extra burden would be placed upon the seller
in refiling the contract, but much litigation and loss on the part
of the innocent public would be prevented. 15
Oklahoma, the law of which governs this case according to con-
flict of laws principles, 8 passed its own law providing that a condi-
tional sale contract will be void as against bona fide purchasers or
creditors of a vendee unless filed in the office of the register of deeds
in the county in which the property is kept..7 Unlike the UCSA, how-
ever, Oklahoma decisions denied a duty on the part of the vendor to
to file the contract in the state to which the goods were removed,
holding his reservation of title good everywhere if he had complied
with the laws of the state where the contract was made and in which
the goods were originally held by the buyer.'8 This position has been
summarized in this statement:
If after a valid sale, a chattel is taken into another state without
the consent of the vendor, the interest of the vendor is not di-
vested as a result of any dealing with the chattel in the second
state.' 9
Applying Oklahoma law, it is obvious that Hudiburg had no duty to
refile in Wisconsin. How is it then that the case holds the opposite?
Wisconsin, in order to give the USCA uniform application, adopted New
Jersey's construction of it in Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First National
Bank of Milltown,2 0 which held, in effect, that when the law of the
place where the contract was made is opposed to a statutory policy
of the state of the forum, the statutory policy prevails. The court
states in Forgan v. Smedal:
The common law is the law of the forum in which the agree-
ment for sale was made and consummated ... (A)s a general
rule a transfer of property valid where made, is effectual every-
where, but a universal (sic) recognized exception to this rule is
that, where it is opposed to some statutory policy of the state of
the rei sitae and where it is sought to be enforced, the statute is
paramount and the common law rule is nullified thereby."
'5 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, U.C.S.A. §6, at 9; §14, at 23.
'6 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §265 (1934) ; "The validity and effect of a
chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract, (§272) are governed by the law
of the state where the chattel was located at the time the instrument was
executed..."
17 Supra note 12.
18 Commercial Credit Co. v. Williams, 174 Okla. 160, 50 P.2d 141 (1935).
19 RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §275.
2098 N.J.L. 29, 119 Atl. 94 (1922).
21 Forgan v. Smedal, 203 Wis. 564, 569, 234 N.W. 896, 898 (1931).
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The result is that although Oklahoma law imposes no duty of refiling
upon a conditional sale vendor in order for his security interest to
prevail as against a "b.f.p.," Wisconsin policy to the contrary will pre-
vail. Thus although Hudiburg filed his conditional sale contract in Okla-
homa six days after it was signed,22 in accord with Oklahoma law, since
Wisconsin requires refiling upon removal, he must necessarily have filed
here upon discovering that the goods were in Wisconsin.
This would seem to be the sole rationale necessary to support
the decision, but the Court confuses the issue by discussing the effect
of James' making the down payment by worthless check upon the title
he acquired-a question extraneous to the real issue:
Where goods are sold and delivered in exchange for a check
and the parties do not express any intention with respect to
the passage of title to the buyer, the courts hold different views
as to what is implied.23
At common law, before payments came to be made by check, there
were both ordinary sales with a lien in the seller where no credit was ex-
tended, and cash sales in which property interest didn't transfer until
the price was paid, i.e. payment was concurrent with delivery. The
"concurrent" aspect was somewhat flexible so that delivery might be
made for a short period before payment, but the parties treated the
deal as if the transfer and payment were made at substantially the
same time.2'
As payment by check came into use, an issue arose as to whether
payment was made when the check was given or when it was cashed,
i.e. whether the property interest passed immediately or whether it
passed conditioned upon the check's being honored by the bank. The
common law treated payment by check as merely conditional. This
view was adopted by Vold and termed "substantially simultaneous
cash sale."125 Under this theory, if the check was dishonored, the seller
could retake his goods from the buyer and from sub-buyers-even a
sub-purchaser in good faith. In order to protect this bfp and increase
the negotiability of goods, a theory developed of which Williston was
the chief exponent-"the voidable title unless reserved" concept.
26
22 Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, supra note 1, at 282, 116 N.W. 2d at 253.23 1d. at 286, 116 N.W. 2d at 285.
2 4 VOLD, LAW OF SALES §29 (2d ed. 1959).
25 Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales "Substantially Simultaneous" and Con-
flicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 111 (1950): The delivery of goods and
payment by check are treated as substantially simultaneous by the parties, i.e.
the property interest is considered to pass when the check is honored. This
view is based on the theory that a seller delivers goods in exchange for the
cash which the check represents, not in exchange for the check itself. Re-
ceipt of a certified check provides stronger basis for inferring that the seller
accepted the check in absolute payment.
262 WILLISTON ON SALES §§346a, 346b (rev. ed. 1948); The Seller delivers the
goods in exchange for the check itself unless he affirmatively shows the
contrary at the time of delivery.
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Other theories, "indicia of ownership" and "estoppel" among them,
also aided this protection.2 7 The ultimate theory in increasing the
negotiability of goods is embodied in the proposed UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE-the "voidable title even with express reservation 28 theory,
which when applied to bad check cash sale cases results in the "b.f.p.'s"
protection in all instances.
The reader will note that all these theories relate to cash sales.
Cash sales may be waived by an agreement showing usage or exten-
sion of credit. One type of credit sale is a conditional sale contract
which, along with the check for the down-payment, is consideration
for the seller's delivery of the article, and expresses the intention with
respect to the passage of title, all of which eliminates the above men-
tioned theories from consideration and makes the conditional sale
contract the basis for the relationship between the parties. 29
The Court concludes that James had the interest of a conditional
sale vendee, viz. a title voidable by the vendor against the vendee but
not against "b.f.p.'s" or creditors of the vendee whose interests might
attach before the vendor has filed his contract.2 0 This holding is con-
sistent with conditional sales law which makes the seller's reservation
of title void as against "b.f.p.s" or creditors of the vendee unless filed in
the state where the contract was executed, with the additional require-
ment of refiling upon notice of removal imposed on out-of-state con-
ditional sale vendors by Wisconsin courts as evidenced in Forgan v.
Smedal, supra.31 The Hudiburg decision is based, however, on the
last of the three cash sale theories above outlined:
Since the Uniform Commercial Code applies the rule that a
worthless check only renders the buyer's title voidable even when
given in full payment, since that appears to us to be the sounder
view, and since there is nothing to show that under Oklahoma
law the effectiveness of a conditional sales contract is suspended
until the check given as a down payment is cashed, we conclude
that James did acquire the property interest of a conditional sale
contract vendee.2
This language concerns the writer, for even an application of the
liberal Forgan view makes it difficult to justify reliance on that which
is not the law in Wisconsin. The fact the Code is being considered
27 Void, supra note 24, §30.2 8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-403: "A purchaser of goods acquires all title
which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser
of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest pur-
chased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though . . ; (b)
the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored . .;
21 VOLD, supra note 24, §30; WILLISTON, supra note 26, §346.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra note 21.3 2 Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, supra note 1 at 286, 116 N.W. 2d at 255.
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for passage in Wisconsin and that the Court may favor its passage
provides no license to base decisions upon it prematurely, particularly
when the same conclusion could have been reached applying existing
law.
The opinion then sets out the question whether Hudiburg's re-
scission was effective against Ponce.33 This issue was raised by
appellant. Hudiburg contended that since the contract was rescinded
by him, he should not be required to file it in Wisconsin because there
is no point in filing a void contract. 34 The Court passes this argu-
ment off with a statement that Hudiburg had to do more than rescind
in order to avoid James' voidable property interest:
... in order to avoid James' voidable property interest coupled
with possession so that he could pass no title to a good faith
purchaser for value, Hudiburg must have repossessed the auto-
mobile or in some other way made it impossible for a pur-
chaser to buy in good faith.3 5
It is apparent from the facts that Hudiburg was unable to repossess
the car because he did not discover its whereabouts until two years
after it had been removed from Oklahoma. 36 But the court says:
Had the contract been filed in Milwaukee County under §122.14
Stats., within 10 days after Hudiburg received notice the auto
had been removed to Milwaukee, it could have enforced its
rights under the contract.37
Where is the logic to support such a conclusion? The recording re-
quirement is a "pure notice" requirement, i.e. the recordation provides
constructive notice to sub-vendees of the conditional buyer that the
conditional seller has a security interest in the property and that his
"seller" hasn't full title. When Hudiburg discovered the removal two
years after the contract was executed, the subvendee had been "owner"
of the auto for one year, this making it physically impossible for
recordation to be notice to him of Hudiburg's security interest. This
ridiculous result is even inconsistent with present Wisconsin law to
the effect that the constructive notice of filing is better notice than
actual notice by commencement of an action against a vendee before
the sub-vendee purchases. 38 (Is this not carrying the constructive notice
theory of filing a bit too far, or is the price paid for "balancing" the
equities between vendor, vendee and "b.f.p." by legislation a distortion of
"common sense"?)
331d.
34Brief for Appellant, Appendix 110-111, Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, 17
Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W. 2d 252 (1962).
35 Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, supra note 1,at 288, 116 N.W. 2d at 256.
36 Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, supra note 1, at 282, 116 N.W. 2d at 253.
3 Hudiburg Chevrolet v. Ponce, supra note 1, at 288, 116 N.W. 2d at 256.
38 Universal Credit Co. v. Finn, 212 Wis. 601, 250 N.W. 391 (1933).
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For the present, it seems that the practicing attorney would do
well to file the conditional gales contract of a vendor in Hudiburg's
position. If the UCC is adopted in this state, filing will be the only
way in which a vendor can protect his reservation of title, and then
the attorney's chief concern will be whether or not the title has been
"perfected," 39 the requisites of which are not within the scope of this
article.
MARGARET M. HUFF
39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§2-401, 9-302.
19631
